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Abstract
In the past, gift-giving has interested mainly anthropologists because it was
taken to be a primitive mode of exchange. Recent contributions of econo-
mists acknowledge however that gift-giving is still present in modern exchange
economies. In this paper gifts are characterized by motivations. Two main
features of gift giving are to be explained: (in-)adequacy and (non-)reciprocity.
It is argued that social approval is potentially a powerful explanation of gift-
giving. We relate the results to the market economy and try to explain the
anomaly that gift-giving is sometimes reduced after compensation is o¤ered.
Keywords: gift-giving, reciprocity, adequacy, social approval.
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1 Introduction
Gift exchange has interested mainly anthropologists because of the extravagance and
importance of gift-giving in primitive societies (Camerer [11], p. 180). This seems
to suggest that gift exchange is not of much importance in today’s market oriented
economies. But, as is realized by now, the gift exchange oriented tribal economies have
not been destroyed but sometimes even ‡ourished in the presence of a market economy
(Gregory [23]). Recent contributions by economists also acknowledge the role of
gift-giving in modern market-oriented economies, be it somewhat hidden in speci…c
settings. Akerlof [2] for instance, argues that the gift of an employee is the amount
of work in excess of the minimum standard. And Rabin [34] considers gift-giving
equilibria as situations where fairness considerations lead to cooperative behavior.
The ’ef‡orescence of gift exchange’ thesis, by which it is meant that gift exchange
has not su¤ered under the impact of market economies1, is therefore considered as a
valid description of modern exchange economies.
It is in the aim of this paper to give an overview of the main contributions about
gift-giving in the economics literature. The way this is done is by categorizing the gifts
by motivations. In addition to the motivations found in the existing literature, it is
argued that social approval is potentially a powerful explanation of many phenomena
related to the topic.
The setup is as follows. First, in section 2 some characteristics of gift-giving are
discussed. Di¤erent approaches based on motivations are discussed in section 3. Each
approach is examined on its potential of explaining the characteristics as mentioned
in section 2. Section 4 extends the discussion to the relation with markets. A general
discussion and some conclusions are provided in the …nal section.
2 The Gift
The essential characteristics of a gift are ill understood as is substantiated by the
strongly diverging claims made in the literature. This section brie‡y discusses the
views being hold and examines its validity and coherence. Two aspects in particular
form the backbone of the discussion throughout the paper: reciprocity and adequacy.
Reciprocity. At …rst sight it seems quite obvious that a gift is voluntary by
nature. But anthropologists stress that although voluntary on guise, factually gifts
have strong reciprocal properties (Mauss [32], Codere [13]). One has not even only
a duty to give, but also to receive and to return. The extravagance of gift-giving
in primitive societies is underlined by the fact that a failure of accomplishing one’s
obligations to reciprocate often eventuates in warfare and the loss of dignity.2 It is
therefore often thought that reciprocal behavior is necessarily connected with gift
1The term is borrowed from Gregory [23]. He relates it to the impact of colonization which is
broadly interpreted here as the introduction of a market economy.
2This occured for example among the Kwakiutl. It should be noted however that their use of
warfare mostly refers to warfare directed to an individual and not so much between nations. For a
detailed description of the Kwakiutl, see Codere [13].
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exchange. According to Camerer [11] however, it is ”especially misleading to assume
that modern gift-giving must be reciprocal”. It is indeed reasonable not to assume
that it is a necessary aspect. Consider for example the case of blood giving. The
giving of blood is not directed to speci…c individuals but to an anonymous agent, as
carefully remarked by Arrow [5]. Gifts or donations of this kind can by assumption
not elicit reciprocal gifts, albeit this not immediately signi…es that non-reciprocity
is also unlikely to occur in personal relationships. But consider the higher e¤ort of
workers above minimum …rm standards. This is not always reciprocated by the …rm
in the form of higher wages or bonuses (see Akerlof [2]). If we take this behavior as a
gift of the worker to the …rm, then reciprocity is not connected within (fairly) personal
relationships either. The correct conclusion would be that gifts are not necessarily
reciprocal in nature. If we are to explain the existence of gift-giving, we also have
to explain why certain kinds of gifts are given with a reciprocal intention and why
others are not.
Adequacy. Consider the following two quotes. According to Camerer ([11], p.
198) ”A deliberate cash gift is a polite way of saying, we care about you less”. And
Douglas puts it even more to our imagination by writing: ”...in our society the line
between cash and gift is ... carefully drawn. It is all right to send ‡owers to your aunt
in the hospital, but never right to send the cash they are worth” (Douglas [14], p.
58). One wonders why it is so bad to make a gift in cash. Standard microeconomic
arguments tell us that it can never be worse to get money rather than a speci…c good.
You are still able to buy that speci…c good but you may decide to buy some other
more preferred good instead. If gifts do not maximize the receiver’s utility given his
preferences and the costs incurred by the giver, we call them inadequate gifts. There is
ample empirical evidence of such inadequate gifts. The well documented destruction
of by the Kwakiutl …ts the description best, witness the following quote:”... she
ordered one of her kinsmen to tow it [the copper] to sea behind a canoe and to cut
it adrift in deep water and let it sink. ’This is my gift to you, O chief’.” (Drucker
and Heizer [15], p. 105). This is an example of the most extreme case of inadequacy
where the gift is worthless to the receiver. Less extreme examples include birthday
and business presents.
The challenge, then, is to …nd theories of gift-giving that are capable of unifying
the diverging perceptions of gift-giving. This is the purpose of the next section.
3 Modeling gifts
Being familiar with the characteristics of gifts, we next review some approaches in the
literature and determine the potential explanation power of each of them. The aim
of this section is to assess competing models of gift-giving with regard to the char-
acteristics mentioned. In order to structure the discussion we …rst propose to give a
classi…cation of the di¤erent models based on the assumptions about behavioral moti-
vations. Of course, other classi…cations are possible but from an economic modelling
point of view it seems above all convenient to take motivations as the fundamental.
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Motivation of giving Aim of gift
3.1 Altruism making other happy
3.2 Egoism I exchange
3.3 Egoism II warm glow,social approval
3.4 Strategical signalling, building trust
3.5 Fairness norms, reducing inequity
3.6 Survival selection
In the …rst approach, gifts are motivated by altruistic feelings. By altruism we
mean that my state of happiness is dependent of that of the other. The second
approach assumes that egoism is the primary motivation of giving. This is very
close to altruism since ultimately it is in your own bene…t in both cases. To avoid
such confusion, we take it as altruism if the utility of the other directly enters my
utility function and egoism otherwise. In the third approach, gifts are considered as
strategic acts. The fourth approach starts from ethical considerations. Finally, the
…fth approach tries to explain giving by evolutionary arguments. Throughout the
paper the aim is to stay as close to standard economic arguments as possible. Each
time, the approach of modelling gifts is evaluated on its explanation power considering
the characteristics of the gifts as discussed in the previous section: reciprocity and
adequacy.
3.1 Altruism
The most obvious approach lending support for gift-giving is probably that where per-
sons have altruistic feelings. They can have either preferences for the consumption
level or even the utility level of the other. The structure of such a utility func-
tion is given by Ui = Ui(xi; Uj(xj)), where xi is the consumption level of person i
If person j has altruistic feelings for person i as well, there is an in…nite regress:
Ui = Ui(xi; Uj(xj ; Ui(xi; Uj(:::)): The regress easily becomes an unbounded process







Then the reduced form of the utility function follows straightforwardly by substi-








Clearly, this is …nite for ® ¸ 0 and 0 · ¯ < 1.
3.1.1 Discussion
Altruistic feelings will take care of a redistribution such that an optimal balance
results between personal consumption and consumption of the other. If personal
consumption is too high for one person, he can gain by giving some of it to the other.
Existence of gift giving can therefore be rationalized, including one-sided giving and
anonymous giving (if one has altruistic feelings for others in general). But this is as far
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as we can get within this approach. Inadequacy of gifts can under no circumstances
be a prediction by this model since this would not only lower the receivers payo¤, but
also that of the giver.
3.2 Egoism I: Gifts as exchange mechanism
Gifts are found most profoundly in primitive societies. It is not unreasonable to
assume that at least initially gifts served as a way to separate production and con-
sumption. In this way consumption could be diversi…ed and production could be
increased through specialization. The market economy can in this way be interpreted
as a more e¢cient way of exchange, one where gifts are replaced by the use of money.3
Indeed, Kranton [29] argues that this is the case. In her model, agents choose between
reciprocal (gift) exchange and market exchange. Since the market is characterized by
a thickness externality –more agents on the market reduces search costs– eventually
all gift exchange relationships vanish whenever the market size exceeds a threshold
level.
While intuitively appealing, the model of Kranton [29] cannot account for the
coexistence of gift exchange and market exchange.4 If contemporary markets are so
e¢cient as we think they are, why do people still partly stick to gift exchange? Is it not
just cheaper to buy all goods and services at the market? Of course, one reason could
be that some products cannot be e¢ciently produced on the market. Another line of
reasoning is provided in Van de Klundert and Van de Ven [38]. They argue that gift
exchange contains a social interaction element that is valued in itself by the trading
agents. Quite often there is a need for mutual sympathy and recognition. These
are suppressed entirely in the formal anonymous markets usually studied (Bowles
[10], Van de Klundert and Van de Ven [38]). But mutual sympathy is rooted in
human nature, as is so breathlessly described in Kropotkin [31]. Thus workers develop
sentiment for their co-workers and institution (Akerlof [2]) and gifts ’symbolize and
convey meaning’ (Camerer [11], p. 181).
In the terminology of Khalil [28], gift exchange provides symbolic utility on top of
substantive utility. A good consumed therefore gives its ordinary substantive utility
–in a market exchange as well as in a gift exchange relationship – and on top of that
the agent experiences symbolic utility but only if the trade has been accomplished in
a gift exchange relationship. This symbolic utility has to be explained in somewhat
more detail. Let the valuation ratio refer to the ratio of utilities that one experiences
in a gift exchange relationship and on the market. It is suggested by Van de Klundert
and Van de Ven [38] that the valuation ratio is dependent on the market size in
two directions. First the valuation ratio tends to increase as the market gets larger.
This is so because mutual sympathy and recognition are lacking in market exchange
3Barter can in this respect be interpreted as a market economy without money as an intermediate
good.
4This is not entirely right. The model is able to predict market size for which gift exchange is
sustainable. But the model cannot explain how evolution got us in this equilibrium except for some
shocks that can be responsible for this. If we start in a gift exchange relationship and some agents
…nds it attractive to enter the market, then the model predicts that all agents enter the market.
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relationships, making sympathy more valuable. However, there is also a tendency
for the valuation ratio to decline. This idea builds on the literature on cognitive
dissonance in psychology. People have a resistance to change that is lower if more
people are supporting a certain view. If agents have to decide whether to stay in
their personal gift exchange relationship or to enter the market, then the decision to
enter the market gets easier with a larger market size; in essence if more people are
supporting the same view. It is argued that these two opposing tendencies are likely
to result in a valuation ratio that is …rst declining and then increasing in the market
size. Under appropriate conditions, this model predicts that the market can become
e¢cient enough to attract part of the population. But as the market gets larger, the
valuation ratio becomes larger (lack of sympathy becomes more and more oppressing)
and the people who stayed in the gift exchange will decide not to enter the market
after all. They stay even though the market has become more e¢cient due to the
larger size. This can be a stable equilibrium, no agent having the incentive to switch
regimes. As a result part of the population is involved in market exchange and part
of the population in gift exchange.
3.2.1 Discussion
The model described is interesting in itself since it argues that the focus of economics
should not be a one-sided inquiry into the market as a possible exchange mechanism.
In addition, the model can explain a number of things mentioned in the previous
section.
First it is able to explain the seemingly inadequacy of gifts by taking sympathy
into account. For example, it can be that the market provides the same good at
lower costs. If people still consume the good within their gift exchange relationship
then this points to an inadequate gift. The reason is that part of the utility is
neglected; symbolic utility. Substantive utility is higher in the market (more goods
at the same costs) but the market provides no symbolic utility. Hence, on net gift
exchange is preferable. If in reality we only look at substantive utility, then the
gift seems inadequate. If we take into account symbolic utility, there is no matter
of inadequacy. Once we take this properly into account we are able to explain the
sustainability of gift exchange.5
Secondly, gifts have an obligatory element to reciprocate. It is even part of the
motivation to reciprocate gifts. If some agent does not return the relationship ends
and both enter the market.6 As a consequence, anonymous gift-giving cannot be
explained by exchange as a motivation to give.
Despite these attractive futures, some features mentioned above cannot be ex-
plained by the model. The model is not able to explain why some gifts have no
reciprocal character or why we can trust people in the …rst place, something that is
5There can still be ine¢ciency in that everybody could be made better of if all people would
enter the market or all staying in their gift exchange. This is due to the existence of externalities
that are present in the model.
6This is partly due to the assumed tit-for-tat strategy of the players. But it seems that this or
any such strategy where the cheater is ultimately punished is reasonable.
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resolved in section 3.4.
3.3 Egoism II: Social approval
Searching for motivations for charity-giving, Andreoni assumes that people have a
taste for giving. His ”egoists” and ”impure altruists” do not only care about the
supply of the public good that they donate for, but also experience a ”warm glow”
from having ”done their bit.” (Andreoni [3], p. 1448). Thus in his model contributions
to a public good are made not only for the bene…ts of public good supply but also for
experiencing the warm glow feeling. Here we go one step further in trying to explain
why people get this warm feeling from giving. The basic hypothesis is that people are
searching for social approval. The warm glow is therefore due to the social approval
received and not so much by the giving itself. That is, the gift is a mean to get a
warm glow and has no intrinsic value in its own in this respect.
As an application of the preceding consider the supply of voluntary labor. Social
approval is derived by making e¤orts in the form of voluntary labor that is bene…cial
to the others. The supply of voluntary labor can appropriately be interpreted as a
gift since you transfer valuable endowments to other persons. By means of voluntary
labor you make the gift and through the acquired social approval you experience a
warm glow.7
The model considered below di¤ers from Andreoni [3], Holländer [26], and Barham
et al. [6] in the following way. In Andreoni [3] and Holländer [26] the focus is on
contributions to public goods and therefore he assumes that the voluntary labor is
bene…cial to all persons, including the giving person. Likewise, Barham et al. [6]
consider volunteer work devoted to a club good. This does not completely …t our
concept of a gift. Here the voluntary labor supply is devoted to production that is
bene…cial to the other persons only.
Consider then a highly stylized economy in which there are only two persons
(i = 1; 2) and one consumption good x. The consumption good can alternatively be




i ; 0 · ® · 1: (1)
The consumption good can be purchased by supplying labor. Each person takes
the market wage w as given and has endowment ¼; the ”gift of nature”. Their total
time constraint is normalized to unity and has to be divided between paid labor (1¡li)
and volunteer work (li). The production process of voluntary labor is governed by
xj = F (li): The fact that voluntary labor also produces the same good x means that
it is either the same good or a good substitute in the same commodity bundle.
In short, the total consumption of good x by person i is given by the sum of his
endowment, his own purchases on the market, and the gift by the other player j:
xi = ¼i + w(1¡ li) + F (lj): (2)
7The focus here is on the the supply on voluntary labor but it can be easily substituted for charity
giving. In an empirical study Duncan [16] …nds that money and time are perfect substitutes as a
gift.
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To simplify matters throughout the section it is assumed that the good produced
by voluntary labor is governed by a linear technology:
F (li) = ±li:
Unless mentioned otherwise, throughout the text it is assumed that ± < w so that
volunteer work is less productive than paid labor.
As already mentioned, special about the supply of voluntary labor is that the
e¤orts made result in social approval.8 Additional utility of social approval can be
derived by making more e¤orts than the other. Similarly, the individual experiences
disutility if it turns out that the other spends more of his time doing volunteer work.
As a measure of approval we conjecture that this is determined by the value of the gift
in terms of forgone wages. The rationale for this assumption is that you can get social
approval even by someone who does not bene…t from the gift in terms of ordinary
utility – it is the e¤ort that counts – but also that with a low market wage the gift is
valued low since making the gift does in this case not take much of a sacri…ce. Both
elements are re‡ected in the following proposed social approval function:
si = w(li ¡ lj): (3)
The total of extended utility of player i is assumed to be additive in his ordinary
utility of consumption in the sense of (1) and the social approval as given by (3):
ui = vi + ¯si; (4)
where ¯ is some positive constant. This concept of utility captures precisely the view
of Harsanyi who writes9: ”People’s behavior can largely be explained in terms of two
dominant interests: economic gain and social acceptance”.
Substituting (2) and (3) into the extended utility function (4) gives for player i:
ui = [¼i + w(1¡ li) + ±lj]® + ¯w(li ¡ lj): (5)
Note that social approval is measured by the forgone wage income of the voluntary
labor supply, but that ordinary utility increases only by the actual consumption
derived from it. One can think of this as a matter of adequacy. The more adequate
the gift in terms of my preferences (higher production per unit of lj ; i.e. a higher
±), the more utility I derive from it. But in comparing my status to that of another
person, I do not take into account the ordinary utility I derive from it, but the e¤orts
incurred by the other player. For the time being, it is assumed that the player cannot
adjust the adequacy of the gift (±), an assumption that will be dropped later on.
The equilibrium strategies for both players are derived as follows. The problem
for both players is to maximize extended utility with respect to the size of the gift (li)
taking the market wage w as given, as well as the gift of the other player. This Cournot
8In the current setup, voluntary labor supply is not a conspicuous good in this sense, since
whatever part of the endowment is given away does not add to ordinary utility. Conspicuous goods
on the other hand increases status as well as ordinary utility from consumption.
9Quoted from Gächter and Fehr [20], p. 341.
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behavior results in two upward sloping reaction curves determining the optimal li as
a function of lj: l¤i (lj): These are drawn in …gure 1 below.
10 There are two reasons
for the positive slopes. First, as the other player’s gifts gets larger, social approval is
lowered. Since this creates disutility for the receiving player by loosing status, he has
an incentive to increase countergifts as well. The second reason is that if the gift that
is received increases, the marginal utility of the consumption good declines: vxx < 0.
This makes gift-giving relatively cheap and provides additional incentives to increase
the e¤orts made. The …rst proposition assures the possible existence of gift-giving:





1¡® ¡ w: (ii) ¹¼¯ < 0; ¹¼w < 0.
Proof. All proofs are in the appendix.
The intuition behind the result is that for large ¼ (endowment) or high ¯ (weight-
ing parameter of social approval) the marginal utility of giving is higher than the
marginal utility of consumption. This is even the case where both players are the
same in all respects and will therefore not derive utility from status in the equilib-
rium. The reason that they still make positive gifts is caused by the fact that they
take the other’s consumption level as given thereby ignoring that in equilibrium the
other will make countergifts. The result has some features of a ’rat race’ where every-
one is better of when the race is canceled, but given that everybody is racing, each
individual is better o¤ trying to win (Goodstein [22], p. 157). However, it partly
escapes from the pessimistic analysis of, for example, Hirsch [25] because besides the
negative ’rat race’ e¤ect, there is also the positive e¤ect of the gift; the rat race has
some productive elements in the form of voluntary labor.
The argument made is that even if both agents are identical in all respects, gift
giving can be an equilibrium outcome. This makes a strong case for the existence
of gift-giving. The model is also capable of predicting non-reciprocal giving. This is
illustrated in …gure 2. By lowering the endowment of player 2, ¼2, his best response
curve l¤2(l1) shifts downward. He becomes poorer and consequently experiences a
higher marginal utility of consumption. This makes gift-giving relatively less attrac-
tive for him. In …gure 2 ¼2 is decreased up to the point where the best response to
the positive gift of player 1 is a gift of size zero. (Some matter of minor importance:
suppose that for one reason or another a gift always have to reciprocated. Then
curiously enough, Aristotle’s wisdom that ”it is easier not to take than to give”11 is
indeed correct.)
It is possible to make a conjecture why anthropologists stress the obligatory as-
pects of gift-giving whereas Camerer [11] …nds this misleading for modern societies.
As should be clear from the discussion, non-reciprocal gift-giving can be explained
by di¤erences in endowments. If it is reasonable to expect that di¤erences in endow-
ments have increased over time, then making non-reciprocal gift-giving has become
more likely.
10The …gure is drawn for ±=w < 1:




















Figure 2: Non-reciprocal giving
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So far, nothing has been said about the adequacy of the gift. This is reasonable
enough if the preferences of the other player are not known to the other player. In
that case, misperceptions of other persons preferences can easily result in inadequate
gifts. With some slight modi…cations, inadequacy of the gift itself can also be an
equilibrium outcome.12 Suppose both players are allowed to determine the adequacy
of their gift, say by determining which kind of good to give. Formally then a second
good should be introduced into the model. But without loss of generalization it is
also possible to let the players determine the productivity of their voluntary labor
e¤ort (±) as a proxy of the adequacy. A less e¢cient production technology points to
a less substitutable good: the rate at which the consumption good can be substituted
for the gift decreases. The higher is ±, the higher is the adequacy of the gift. The
possibility of adjusting the adequacy has no e¤ect as long as we stick to Cournot
behavior. If the actions of the other are taken as given adequacy is of no importance
since it does not change my marginal decision either. Suppose then that the giver
makes a conjecture about how the receiver responds to a change in adequacy. Here
adequacy comes into play. We have13:
Proposition 2 Suppose that ¼i = ¼j = ¼. Then (i) if ¼ > ¹¼ it is bene…cial from an
individual point of view to lower the adequacy of the gift, and (ii) ±¤i = ±
¤
j = 0:
The …rst assumption serves only to simplify matters (¼i = ¼j; symmetric endow-
ments) and the second condition is equivalent to that of proposition 1 (¼ > ¹¼). Hence,
in every equilibrium with symmetric endowments and positive gift-giving, both play-
ers have an incentive to lower the adequacy of the gift up to the point where adequacy
is zero.14
To see why someone would want to lower the adequacy of his gift, note that by
doing so the marginal utility of consumption of the other player is increased and
that makes it relatively expensive for him to give. The receivers optimal response
function is therefore lower at every gift size. The giver also adjusts his voluntary
labor supply in a downward direction, and on net, ordinary utility remains una¤ected
(see appendix). However, the receiver’s adjustment in voluntary labor supply is larger
in size and hence li¡ lj increases. This implies a positive e¤ect on social approval for
the giver and therefore on extended utility.15
12Again, the focus is on inadequacy of goods from an individual point of view. Examples where gift-
giving is socially ine¢cient can be easily constructed. For example, in a symmetric agent equilibrium,
both agents make equal e¤orts and therefore are equal in status: l1 = l2 , s1 = s2 = 0. Since the
status e¤ect drops out of the utility function, their problem reduces to maximizing the subutility
function vi which is obviously attained by setting li = 0 whenever ± < w, independent of lj : (± < w
indicates that the received gift is less valuable than what is given away.)
13The condition in the proposition is su¢cient but not necessary.
14This latter prediction is taken to be a consequence of the oversimpli…cation of the model. One
can imagine that the valuation of voluntary labor is positively dependent on the adequacy: w
0
(±) > 0:
For instance, if player i gives repeatedly inadequate gifts, then the social approval he gets for a unit
labor is lowered. There may in this case be incentives for player i not to lower the adequacy too
much.
15This is most clearly seen in the case where one of the adequacy levels is already set to zero, say
±j = 0. In this case, the response function of player i is independent of the voluntary labor supply
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3.3.1 Elaboration
The social approval approach can be embedded in a richer structure that explains on
a deeper level the origins of social approval. A common approach is to seek the expla-
nation in terms of social distance. In Akerlof [1] social approval is achieved through
status. Having more of the good increases not only utility of consumption but also ad-
miration by others if exceeding their consumption level. This …ts in our framework of
gifts if one’s (otherwise non-observable) consumption level can be displayed through
giving. Originally this was thought to be happening during the potlatches of the
Kwakiutl where properties were redistributed by means of gift-giving. The purpose
of such a potlatch was thought to be the ”ostentatious and dramatic distribution of
property by the holder of a …xed, ranked and named social position, to other position
holders”.16
A dual approach to the status-good is that people actually prefer to conform
to others rather than distinguish themselves in one way or another. This is also
the approach of Fehr and Schmidt [18] and Bolton and Ockenfels [8] (see section
3.5). Again, giving is a possible way to conform to someone’s consumption level
and gain social approval. It is probably for this reason that, on closer inspection, of
the Kwakiutl ”So-and-so gave many (...) potlatches because he was a great (”highly
ranked”) chief” and not the reverse”.17 ;18
It is not immediately obvious how the social approval approach is capable of
explaining anonymous gift-giving. Recall however that social approval was obtained
from the fact that a gift was made, not necessarily to the person who shows approval.
Surely it is often socially approved to donate to developing countries by the people
of the developed countries. Similarly, you can give blood which is anonymous for the
receiver. But by telling your friends of your act it is not a truly anonymous gift for
everybody. We conjecture therefore that social approval is obtained mostly by people
that are socially close to you. Hence by getting social approval from others than the
receiver you may donate gifts that are anonymous from the viewpoint of the receiver.
3.4 Strategical: Gifts as signalling device
The approach of gift exchange can to a certain degree explain the properties of gift-
giving mentioned in section 2. In the models of Kranton [29] and Van de Klundert and
Van de Ven [38] consumption and production of goods are separated over time. In a
gift exchange relationship, one of the agents involved has to produce …rst and consume
one period later. This agent has to trust upon a return gift from the other agent next
period. Because this other agent consumes …rst before bearing the costs of production,
of j because marginal utility of i is una¤ected. Hence, by decreasing ±i, the response function of j
is shifted downard but does not a¤ect li or vi. But li ¡ lj is obviously lower and si as a consequence
higher.
16Codere [13] p. 63.
17Drucker and Heizer [15] p. 134, emphasis added.
18Contrary to the case of status-seeking behavior, where inadequate gifts were optimal from and
individual point of view, gifts may be either adequate or inadequate. Adequate gifts can possibly
be optimal for instance at (l¤¤1 ; 0)
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he has an incentive to cheat. Even so, the agent has to take into account that cheating
means the end of the relationship. Thus the trade-o¤ is between cheating and entering
the market or to stay in the relationship. The agent that produces …rst is, of course,
aware of this fact, and anticipates the choice of his partner. Only if he trusts his
partner of being honest will he produce …rst.
In both these models, trust is measured by the discount rate. No explicit account
is given of this discount rate, it is assumed to be an exogenously variable.19 The focus
here is on the determination of the level of trust between agents. Ideally one would
determine this level endogenously. This can be handled by assuming that agents
can give credible signals of their trustworthiness. Such signal games are examined in
Camerer [11], Iannaccone [27], Rabin [34], Kranton [30], Carmichael and MacLeod
[12]. Since all these models essentially boil down to the same argument, only a basic
version of the model is presented here. At the end of the section the di¤erences are
explained and another variant of the signalling approach is discussed.
The essential mechanism to determine the other player’s trustworthiness is most
simply modeled within the framework of Camerer [11]. It is assumed that there are
two (groups of) players. Exchange can be realized between those groups. Each group
consists of two types of players: trustworthy players and cheaters.20 The fractions of
these types in the groups are given but the type cannot be observed directly. The
main di¤erence between the types is their payo¤. Trustworthy players are resistant
to cheating. They would feel ashamed if they did, lowering their payo¤. Cheaters
on the other hand …nd it pro…table to cheat, they have no feelings of shame or guilt
whatsoever. The problem now is that I cannot know beforehand if my trade partner
can be trusted. If he is of the trustworthy type the deal will work out …ne, but if he
cheats, my payo¤ will be considerably lower than if I would not have traded at all.
What does the model predict? One result is that if the fractions of honest players
in both groups is large enough, then the honest players will trade at the risk of being
cheated. A more interesting result however is that even if the fractions of honest
players is low, trade can still occur. The chances of meeting a honest trade partner
are low, but if there is a possibility of giving a signal of trustworthiness then this does
not need to be so much of a problem. The signal is to make a gift. This strategy can
be explained as follows. If the fractions of cheaters players is high, then without gifts
nobody would be trading. The payo¤s are in this case not very large, but trading
would on average be even worse for the honest players. Now, if a honest player makes
a gift of a size that a cheater is not willing to make because it is not pro…table enough
for the latter, then this is a signal to the other player that this person is honest. And
if both players are honest, then this can be an equilibrium. In principle the cheater
can make a gift as well, but if the gifts made by the honest person is large enough, the
cost of the gift does not compensate for the payo¤ by cheating.21 If such a separating
19Besides that, it is unclear if reputation as such can be identi…ed with trust. This is an important
point that is elaborated upon in a future paper.
20Nothing depends on the assumption of two di¤erent groups. One may also interprete them as
two single players who are with some probability a cheater or a trustworthy person.
21Thus a one-shot Prisonner’s Dilemma (PD) game does not satisfy the assumptions needed for
a seperating equilibrium. A necessary assumption is that honest players gain by cooperating with
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equilibrium exists, honest players can signal the trustworthiness of trade partners by
inspection of the size of the gift received.
Example. As an illustration of the above, consider the following example. There is
a honest player (H1) who wants to trade with another person on the market. There are
two players that he can trade with but he doesn’t know which one of them is the honest
(H2) and which one is a cheater (C) (he meets each player with probability 0.5). He has
to decide whether to invest (I) or not (N). After investing or not, the trade partner makes
a decision. Players that do not meet a trading agent have a payo¤ 0: The rest of the payo¤s
are as in the matrices below.
H2
I N
H1 I 6=6 ¡10=5




N 5=¡ 10 0=0
As one can see, both the honest and the dishonest players are worst o¤ when they
invested but their trade partner did not. Moreover, both types prefer not to invest if the
other doesn’t. The di¤erence is that the honest player prefers to invest if the other invests
whereas the cheater prefers not to invest if the other invests. (An economic example may
be two persons trading where cheating is bene…cial for both in pecuniary terms, but where
honest players have a sense of guilt outweighing the pecuniary payo¤s and the cheaters have
no sense of guilt.)
It is readily seen that the dominant strategy for the cheater is not to invest.22 What
should H1 do? If he invests, he meets with probability 1/2 H2 who then also invests and
with probability 1/2 C who does not invest. His expected payo¤ is therefore ¡2. His
expected payo¤ by not investing equals 0. As a result, the honest player will not invest and
consequently H2 experiences expected utility of 0 by also not investing.
What H2 can do is to make a gift to player H1 before H1 decides. Suppose that he




H1 I 9=3 ¡7=2
N 8=¡ 13 3=¡ 3
C
I N
I 9=¡ 2 ¡7=¡ 1
N 8=¡ 13 3=¡ 3
If C does not do the same then it is obvious for H1 what to do. Now he knows
that if he gets a gift after meeting his trading partner, then the other is honest and so he
should invest. Note that the expected utility of H2 is now equal to 1:5 which is still an
improvement for him even considering the costs of the gift. What remains to be shown is
that the cheater does indeed not make a gift. Consider the right part of the matrix above.
If the cheater makes the gift of 3, then whatever the strategy of H1 is, he is worse o¤ than
the payo¤ of 0 when he didn’t make the gift. The best thing he can do is therefore indeed
not to make a gift.
another honest player and loose by cooperating with a cheater. By the structure of a PD-game,
cooperating is never a best-response no matter what the type of the other player.
22Mixed strategies are not considered here as they are not equilibrium strategies (see the
appendix in Camerer [11]).
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3.4.1 Discussion
Obviously this model is able to explain the existence of gift giving. It can also account
for some other aspects of gifts mentioned in section 2. It can explain one-sided gift
giving. If the fraction of honest players in group 1 is large and if group 2 consists
mainly of cheaters, then an equilibrium can be that honest players of group 2 must
make a gift to signal their honesty, but for group 1 it is not necessary to give. The
extreme case is where all players in group 1 and only one player in group 2 are honest.
Obviously the players in group 1 do not have to give to signal whereas the player in
group 2 does have to give. This can explain why gift-giving is not always reciprocal in
nature and also when it is: if in both groups the number of cheaters is relatively large.
Additionally, the model is able to explain inadequate gift-giving. Recall that the gift
must be large enough to make it unpro…table for the cheaters to give. But if gifts
are adequate, under some circumstances it can still be pro…table for cheaters to give
since they bene…t a lot from the gift they receive! This would make it impossible to
signal the honest players from the cheaters. Whenever the cheaters …nd it relatively
more pro…table also to signal, gifts should be more inadequate or else they fail in
their aim.
Example (ctd.) Suppose for simplicity that the honest player H1 in the above game
also makes a gift. This does not change the strategy of the cheater since both his payo¤s
from playing N or I are now increased. The adequacy also does not matter in this case
since it does not change the strategy. But suppose that another pre-stage is constructed.. In
this pre-stage, some entering costs must be paid. If the entering costs, T , are paid then the
rest of the game is as in the above example. If the entering costs are not paid by a player,
then he is not allowed to play the second stage and both will not invest. The purpose of
the entering costs in the pre-stage is that the adequacy of the gift can now in‡uence the
strategy that will be played by the cheater. To see this, consider a gift size of x. Only a
fraction ± of the gift adds to the payo¤ of the other player. The parameter ± is a measure
of the adequacy of the gift. The cheater now has to choose to pay the entry costs or not,
and if he pays the entry costs then he has to decide whether to give or not. We know that
in equilibrium, once entry costs are paid, he will not give (otherwise the signal is useless).
But he may still pay the entry costs and then collect the possible gift of the other. This
would give him an expected payo¤ of :5(¡T + ±x). To prevent him from doing this, the
entry costs must be such that it is not pro…table for the cheater to enter the second stage
in the …rst place: T > ±x or ± < T=x. As a result, the adequacy may not be too high.
Drawbacks are …rst that no account is given how gift exchange contributes to the
feeling of sympathy or mutual aid. It purely serves instrumentally as a strategic act
to observe the honesty of the trading partner rather than being part of our biological
’hardware’ inclinations. The second minus is that, since an anonymous gift does not
reveal anything about the intentions or type of the giver, by de…nition it cannot be a
signal. This rules out anonymous gift-giving.
The other models are in the same spirit where gifts are taken to be strategic in
nature. Carmichael and MacLeod [12] derive Nash-equilibria where inadequate gift-
giving signals the right intentions for long-term cooperation.23 Kranton [30] derives
23In their setup gifts are necessarily inadequate.
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a strategy for the formation of relationships by incurring a cost at the beginning of
a new relationship and gradually increasing the level of exchange. Rabin [34] calls it
a gift if the intention of the player is to raise the other’s players payo¤ above his or
her’s average Pareto-e¢cient payo¤. It is shown that such considerations can lead to
cooperative behavior with the existence of such gifts. Intentions also play a crucial
role in the model of Iannaccone [27]. Here, it is tried to explain sacri…cial behavior.
Again, sacri…ces are inadequate gifts that signal the good intentions of the players.
This model also features the aspect of sympathetic feelings because the object is to
become a member of a social club good that is anti-congestible.24
Whereas in the above references signals serve to reveal one’s type, there is also
a variant of signalling that reveals one’s strategy. Here, it su¢ces to consider only
one type. Consider the battle-of-the-sexes. The essence of the game is that both
players bene…t only by choosing the same strategy. Each player has a preference
for one strategy over the other and these preferences are di¤erent for both players.
However, choosing di¤erent strategies makes both players worse o¤. Now suppose
that both players can actually make a worthless gift to the other. This is in fact
a reinterpretation of the example taken from Van Damme [36] where there is an
opportunity to burn a certain amount of money. By forward induction, Van Damme
shows that a gift is made with positive probability. The gift serves as a credible threat
of playing a particular strategy. Clearly the gifts are inadequate. It can however also
be shown that adequate gifts are possible.25 Furthermore, as in the case of signalling
types, non-reciprocal gift-giving can occur.26 Note that the objections to the other
signalling games also apply here.
3.5 Ethics
As a …nal motivation for gift-giving the focus is on fairness considerations. The
exposition is short because it is argued that the current motivation can be put in the
framework already discussed.
Fairness is above all a philosophical question. The current state of the debate
about fairness is not yet one that can provide us with de…nite answers about what are
fair principles. A rough but useful classi…cation that divides the economic literature
in two is one where fairness concerns either outcomes of an act or the act itself.27
Both views are discussed next.
In the …rst view fairness is judged on outcomes. This is the approach of Fehr
24Anti-congestible indicates that each member’s participation increases bene…ts on the other mem-
bers, contrary to congestible club goods where the bene…ts decrease with larger utilization of others.
25This is simple to prove. The argument in Van Damme [36] (see in particular his …g. 5) is
independent of what the other player gets. The strategy of each player takes the other player’s
strategy as given and as a result the adequacy of the gift does not matter.
26Ex ante non-reciprocal gift-giving is not an optimal strategy. If only one player is allowed to give,
then he will never use this option. However, since both players only give with a certain probability
(mixed strategy), ex post it can well be that only one player made a gift.
27It is worthwile to note that both views have their counterpart in philosophy. The former (fairness
evaluated on outcomes) is primarily the view of John Rawls whereas the latter (fairness evaluated
on the act itself – i.e. rights) is of primal concern to Robert Nozick.
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and Schmidt [18] and Bolton and Ockenfels [8]. It is assumed that people have a
preference for a fair outcome, or more speci…cally they are inequity averse. People
dislike to be either richer or poorer. In the former case they have the opportunity
to redistribute by giving. In this way the distribution becomes more equal. Such a
redistribution comes at the cost of decreased own income. The trade-o¤ is therefore
between a high absolute income and equal relative income.
The utility function with inequity aversion has the same form as that of social
approval. To compare: …rst there is the term of ordinary utility as a function of mon-
etary income, and second there is the part that now gives disutility as a consequence
of inequality. Inequality is then measured as the di¤erence in income net of the shares
of income given away. Let us denote consumption again by x and the share of income
that is given away by °i. The social approval function is now simply the absolute
value of the income inequality, net of gifts:
si = jµi ¡ µjj; (6)
where µi ´ xi(1¡ °i) + °jxj: Utility is given by:
ui = [xi(1¡ °i) + °jxj ]® ¡ ¯jxi(1¡ 2°i)¡ xj(1¡ 2°j)j; (7)
which is very similar to (5).28 Note in particular that for a rich person (net of
gifts) the derivative with respect to °i has the same properties as that of someone
aiming at social approval: increasing the gift has a negative e¤ect on ordinary utility
and a positive e¤ect in terms of reducing inequality. For a poor person the problem
is somewhat di¤erent but the propositions in the section of social approval remain
valid.
According to the second view hold, fairness is judged on the acts itself. This is for
example the approach taken by Rabin [34]. The general idea is already described in
section 3.4. What matters here are intentions. If the intention of the other player is
good, then I am willing to make a gift in return. For example, if the …rm I work for
pays me the lowest wage possible then his intention is bad even though the wage itself
may be quite reasonable. My e¤ort will as well be poor. If he, on the other hand,
o¤ers me a wage that is advantageous to me rather than to him, then his intentions
are good and I will make a lot of e¤ort. Gifts are in this case signals about fairness
and the analysis of signalling applies. A high wage signals goods intentions. It is also
possible that I judge my own acts on fairness: ”I give something because I think it
is the fair thing to do”. In that case, the analysis corresponds to that in section 3.3
yet with another interpretation of the warm glow feeling.
3.5.1 Experimental evidence
A vast amount of experimental evidence that has been collected is presented in the
papers of Fehr and Schmidt [18] and Bolton and Ockenfels [8]. They test the ex-
planation power of inequity aversion as a behavioral motivation and …nd that the
28The ’2’ appears because the gift changes inequality in both directions: the giver becomes poorer
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propose (8,2) propose (x,y)
Figure 3: An ultimatum game
assumption performs rather well. Consider for instance the game in …gure 3 taken
from Falk et al. [17].
The game is a variation on the ultimatum game and goes as follows. In the …rst
stage the proposer can propose the o¤ers (8; 2) or (x; y), e.g. (8; 2) means 8 for the
proposer, 2 for the responder. The values of (x; y) di¤er among experiments. In the
second stage (after observing the o¤ers of the proposer) the responder can accept, in
which case each player get the proposed o¤er, or reject, in which case none of the
players gets anything.
In the …rst variant of the experiment (x; y) was set to (8; 2). Note that the proposer
can in this case only make the o¤er (8; 2). Clearly, if the responder only cares about
monetary payo¤s he will accept the o¤er giving him a payo¤ of 2 rather than rejecting
and getting nothing. But in fact, in 20 percent of the cases the o¤er is rejected. A
possible explanation can in fact indeed be inequity aversion. Accepting would yield
a higher payo¤ but also an increased inequality between the two players.
This is, however, not the complete story. What happened next is the following.
Another variant was played in which (x; y) was set to (5; 5). The proposer can in this
case o¤er (8; 2) or (5; 5). Suppose that he still sticked to the proposal of (8; 2). This
does not change the situation for the responder. He still ends up with either 2 when
accepting or 0 when rejecting, and the inequality is the same for him as in the …rst
variant. The prediction is therefore that if he accepted (rejected) in the …rst variant
then he should accordingly also accept (reject) the o¤er in the second variant. But
apparently something did change for him because the rejection rate increased from
20 to 45 percent! The explanation of Falk et al. is that intentions matter as well.
In the …rst variant proposers had no choice but to o¤er (8; 2). But in the second
variant they could have chosen to propose (5; 5) but they did not. As a consequence,
the bad intentions of the proposer were punished by the responders. Therefore, they
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conclude, both unfair outcomes and unfair intentions matter.
3.6 Evolution
An increasingly popular view that originates in biology interprets individuals as genes.
Contrary to what is assumed so far, in this case individuals do not choose but are
programmed to play predetermined strategies. Put di¤erently, individuals are strate-
gies. The basic prediction is that the most successful strategies are likely to survive.
A less strict biological interpretation is that of social norms rather than genes, where
norms are determined by the group and form the basis of how cultures evolve over
time (see for instance Nyberg [33], Akerlof [2]).
The evolutionary approach is used by Carmichael and MacLeod [12] to explain
the existence of gift giving. Essential to the perspective taken by them is that the gift
is a signal of trustworthiness. This is discussed in detail in section 3.4. The discussion
there, however, is focused on static one-shot games. What makes the evolutionary
perspective interesting is to examine optimal strategies in repeated games. Essen-
tially, what happens then is the following. Without gifts each individual is randomly
matched to another individual every period. Remember now that each individual is
already a strategy. In this particular case they are either cooperators or defectors. A
gift is in this respect not very helpful to signal your type since your opponent cannot
(by de…nition) change his strategy. But whilst there are not any advantages of giving
in the one-shot game, there certainly are in the repeated game. By giving you can
reveal your type to the other player. If you as a cooperator are matched to another
cooperator then you can decide to stay in that relationship rather than return to the
matching market at the end of the period. It will be clear that in this way cooperators
can gain by making a gift in the …rst period and then stay in that relationship forever.
Again, gifts should not be too adequate otherwise defectors will also gain by giving.
In real life it is unlikely to stay in the same relationship forever. The approach of
Van de Klundert and Van der Lecq [37] is in this respect more realistic. They argue
that you while you don’t stay in the same relationship you can at least increase the
probability of …nding cooperators by making some search costs, e.g. by forming clubs.
Segmentation of society can in this respect be favorable to cooperators.
Here we take the more extreme case where reputation e¤ects are excluded. Every
period each individual is randomly matched to another. What we want to show is
that gift-giving can actually improve the survival chances of cooperators. In this way
we put the social approval approach in a more dynamic framework.
As pointed out, agents play their strategies according to their hard-wires. Their
survival chances are dependent on their expected utility. The higher their expected
utility, the larger the probability that they will survive. With a large population it is
possible to approximate the stochastic process by a deterministic one. Following Van
Damme [35], the dynamics of the fraction cooperators, p, is given by the following
replicator equation (a dot above a variable denotes the time derivative):






Here E(uc;d) denote the expected utility of a cooperator and defector respectively.
This expression, common in evolutionary game theory, expresses the idea that strate-
gies grow in the population if they do better than average (Van Damme [35], p. 849).
We need at least the assumption that cooperators bene…t in one way or another in
terms of utility. This may be for example if they manage to provide a public good
that is bene…cial to both only if each player contributes. Furthermore, they should
bene…t from giving. As a shortcut we take it as a warm glow feeling but as argued
before this can possibly be embedded in the more rich structure of social approval.
To illustrate, consider the game of the …gure below. A cooperator that meets a
cooperator has a payo¤ of 2. If he meets a defector then he has no payo¤. A defector
has a payo¤ of v if matched to a cooperator and 1 if matched to a defector. Clearly,
the cooperating outcome (2; 2) is preferable to the defecting outcome (1; 1)but the




Hence, the expected utility values are given by:
E(uc) = pu(2) + (1¡ p)u(0);
E(ud) = pu(v) + (1¡ p)u(1):
After substitution of these expected utilities in the replicator equation (8) and
setting u(0) = 0 we get:
_p = p(1¡ p) [p[u(2)¡ u(v)]¡ (1¡ p)u(1)] : (RE)
It is clear from this equation that if the initial fraction of cooperators is p < (u(1)+
u(2)¡u(v))¡1u(1) then ultimately there will be defectors only. If the initial fraction of
cooperators is some p > (u(1)+ u(2)¡u(v))¡1u(1) then the population will converge
to cooperators only. The solid line in the left panel in …gure 4 illustrates the case for
v = 4 (i.e. prisoners’ dilemma) where there is always convergence to ’defectors-only’
(p = 0) because _p < 0 no matter what the initial fraction of cooperators is (the arrows
indicate the dynamics). Panel B illustrates the case for v = 1 (stag hunt game) where
both p = 0 and p = 1 are stable outcomes.
Now consider the possibility to make a gift. For defectors this can never be
optimal since they gain nothing by giving. However, cooperators get a warm glow




(uc) = pu(2 + y(x)) + (1¡ p)u(y(x)¡ x);
E
0
(ud) = pu(v + x) + (1¡ p)u(1):
For the cooperators there is a gain of size y(x) from the warm glow but they su¤er
a loss of x due to the probability of meeting a defector and no loss with probability








Prisoners’ dilemma   (v=4 )
parameters: solid line: x=0, y=0, 
dashed line: x=.5, y=2.5.
Stag hunt  (v=1 )
parameters: solid line: x=0, y=0, 
dashed line: x=2, y=2.5.
Figure 4: Evolution
cooperator (they gain nothing if they meet a defector). With these modi…cations in
the utilities, the replicator dynamics can be rewritten into:
_p = p(1¡ p)[p(u(2 + y)¡ u(y))¡ p(u(v + x)¡ u(x)) (RE’)
+ (1¡ p)u(y ¡ x) + E(uc)¡E(ud)]:
The …rst term in the brackets gives the utility gain for cooperators in case they
meet a cooperator, the second term gives the utility gain for defectors in case they
meet a cooperator, the third term is the utility gain for cooperators when they meet
a defector and the last term is the di¤erence in expected utility without gifts. By
comparing (RE’) to (RE) one can see that as long as the sum of the …st three terms
in brackets is positive, giving shifts the replicator equation in an upward direction.
The dashed lines in the …gure show the results for both cases v = 4 and v = 1 for
linear utility. In either case, if y(x)¡x is su¢ciently large, p = 1 is a stable outcome.
In the stag hunt game (right panel) p = 1 becomes more likely for a given initial
fraction of cooperators for a higher y(x)¡ x.
If there exists a population of cooperators that experiences a warm glow of giving
then they may have some survival chances. By the concept of agents playing hard-
wired strategies it is clear that the reciprocity of a gift is dependent on the type
that an agents meets. If he meets a defector the gift is not reciprocated whereas if
he meets a fellow-cooperator then the gift is reciprocated. In the above illustration
society evolves over time to one of cooperators or defectors only. Giving increases
the possibility of a cooperators-only society. If the gifts are too expensive, however,
another possibility arises: a stable society with both cooperators and defectors. The
reason is that for a given fraction of cooperators, defectors bene…t from the higher
gifts. When the fraction of cooperators is high and they make expensive gifts, then a







Prisoners’ dilemma    (v=4)
parameters: x=1, y=2.5. 
p
Figure 5: A mixed equilibrium
fraction of cooperators the defector is not very likely to meet a cooperator and so he
will only bene…t marginally from higher gifts. One and another is illustrated for the
prisoners’ dilemma in the …gure below. With the higher gift we see that there is now
a stable interior equilibrium ps. For any fraction of cooperators p > ps defectors gain
too much from the expensive gift and will increase in population. For any fraction of
cooperators p < ps defectors gain too little and will decrease in population.
It is interesting to see what the e¤ect of the gift’s adequacy on survival chances is.
As in section 3.3 we assume that only a fraction ± of the gift is added to the receivers
payo¤. The payo¤ of each person is therefore decreased by the gift made (x) and
possibly increased by the gift received (±x). The higher ± is, the more adequate the
gift. Expected utilities are now given by:
E
00
(uc) = 2p+ y(x)¡ x+ p±x;
E
00
(ud) = pv + 1¡ p+ p±x:
What happens if a player changes the adequacy of the gift? There are two forces
at work here. The …rst is that by lowering the adequacy of the gift, possible defectors
bene…t less. The second is the exact counterpart of the …rst in that lowering the
adequacy lowers the gain for a possible cooperator. It depends on the shape of the
utility function which e¤ect dominates. The following proposition states this more
precisely for risk-averse agents:





The proposition shows that if people are risk-averse (u
00
< 0) then lowering the
adequacy of the gift is bene…cial for high values of y(x)¡ x because it increases the
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survival chances. This depends on the initial di¤erences in payo¤s (v ¡ 2) because
under risk-aversion, marginal utility is dependent on the utility level. For risk-neutral
agents (u
00
= 0) the replication of each type is independent on the adequacy of the
gift.29 The reason is simple: the replicator dynamics are stated in terms of di¤erences
in expected utility. Both types bene…t equally from an adequate gift because both
have the same probability of meeting a cooperator and the gift is the same for both.
The di¤erence in expected utility is therefore independent of the adequacy of the gift
and under the assumption of risk-neutrality also independent on the initial utility
level. In graphical terms, altering ± does not shift the curve.
4 Gifts and the market
An empirical anomaly exists: suppose you are a giver and someone proposes to reward
your behavior by giving a monetary compensation. Based on standard economic
arguments, you decide that this increase in monetary payo¤s can never make you
worse o¤. Would you change your behavior? If anything you should increase your
gifts since the incentives to do so have become more favorable. However, at times it
is found that when compensation is o¤ered gifts are sometimes actually decreased.
The classical example is the decrease in blood-giving after some compensation was
o¤ered. In another example taken from Gneezy and Rustichini [21] the other way
around is also found, namely that the parents that arrived too late to collect their
children at day-care centers increased in number after a …ne was imposed (the gift is
here the additional time that was spent by the employees). But if the motivation was
altruism or a moral conviction, how could this ever disappear if rewarded or become
worse if penalized? The rest of this section is devoted to explaining that the result is
in fact a logical prediction of many approaches.
Consider …rst the social approval approach. Suppose that a compensation is of-
fered. In this case, the marginal bene…ts of social approval decline. This is so because,
as will be recalled, social approval is valued by the sacri…ce made by the giver and
sacri…ce is lower once compensation is o¤ered. To state this more precisely: let wn
denote the wage that can be earned on the market and wv the compensation for
’volunteer’ work. The compensation is o¤ered by a third party, e.g. the government.
Suppose furthermore that the measure of social approval of voluntary labor is then
appropriately given by
si = (w
n ¡ wv)(li ¡ lj). (3’)
There are two countere¤ects. First, as compensation increases every unit of volun-
tary labor is valued less. Besides this negative e¤ect there is also a positive (income)
e¤ect: the compensation increases the ordinary utility. The following proposition
gives the condition under which the equilibrium value of voluntary labor declines if a
higher compensation is o¤ered. Assume that wv · wn . Then:
29See the appendix for a proof.
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Proposition 4 In a symmetric agent equilibrium l¤¤i > 0 and
@l¤¤i
@wv





1¡® ¡ ¼iand (ii) wv > wn ¡ ±:
The intuition behind condition (i) is as follows. Imagine that the compensation
for voluntary labor increases. This has two e¤ects on the marginal decision: …rst,
the marginal ordinary utility decreases, and second marginal utility of social approval
decreases. Suppose for the moment that the …rst e¤ect dominates the second. Then
marginal ordinary utility is lower than the marginal utility of social approval. In
equilibrium, they must be equal. By reducing the voluntary labor supply marginal
ordinary utility increases and that of social approval remains constant. Hence, by
reducing voluntary labor the equilibrium is restored. By the assumption of decreasing
marginal utility of ordinary utility, the …rst e¤ect is likely to dominate for a low level
of ordinary utility, e.g. a low endowment ¼i.
Condition (ii) serves merely to guarantee positive gift-giving. Interestingly, volun-
tary labor supply decreases at the point wv = 0 only if wn < ±. i.e. if there are gains
from trade in terms of ordinary utility (If both persons would exchange endowments,
both would be better o¤).
We want to relate this result to the interaction between gifts and markets. Market
exchange is taken to be inextricably connected with the use of money and anonymous
agents. Every act has its instantaneous compensation. In the …rst approach, altruism,
a partial compensation would make the gift less e¤ective and so you should never
decrease your gift. In the second approach, gift-giving as an exchange mechanism, it
is argued that exchanging the good on the market would suppress symbolic utility.
This can be harmful even if the market is capable of providing the good at lower
costs but on the other hand can the compensation be helpful in avoiding problems of
distrust. In the third approach gifts served as a signalling device to reveal the type
of the players. Here, the use of money would imply bene…ts for the receiver of the
gift. Unwilling players can anticipate the bene…ts of the gifts and it may actually
be pro…table for them to engage in gift giving. The result is a pooling equilibrium
and the gift as a signal becomes useless (see the example in the text). Finally, in the
approach of social approval, it is shown that compensating can reduce gift-giving. In
the interpretation of opening markets, the creation of a market is in this case the
cause of crowding out of the gift, something that is indeed often observed (see for
instance Frey [19] but also the discussion in Arrow [5]). This conclusion is similar
in spirit to that of Holländer who concludes that it may well be the case that ”the
opening of a market (...) reduces voluntary contributions” (Holländer [26], p. 1165).
One and another suggests that gift-giving can not unconditionally be replaced by
the market mechanism. This conjecture is strenghtened by the fact that in the social
approval approach, extended utility is unchanged by compensating voluntary labor,
but welfare is in fact decreased since there are costs wv incurred by a third party.30
30See the appendix for a proof.
24
5 Evaluation
The main focus of this paper is not to provide a unique uni…ed theory of gift-giving.
Rather, it aims at exposing competing theories and to evaluate them on their expla-
nation power of accounting for the three characteristics reciprocity, adequacy, and
sympathy. The possibility of coexisting motivations for gift-giving should not be dis-
regarded. Perhaps the motivations di¤er between di¤erent kinds of gifts, di¤erent
people, or di¤erent time periods. One can imagine for example that charity is driven
by an intrinsic warm glow feeling whereas voluntary labor is mostly driven by social
approval considerations. And for some people social approval may be a reason for
charity donations whereas for others it is an intrinsic warm glow feeling. Finally,
social exchange may have been a reason for gift-giving in ancient times whereas now
it is mostly a signalling device.
Ultimately it is an empirical matter to determine the main motivation of gift-
giving. A problem to be tackled is that, as the foregoing shows, some motivations
overlap in their predicted outcomes. It is in particular hard to discriminate between
social approval and inequity aversion since they share the basic form. It is out of the
scope of the current paper to subject them to a detailed empirical investigation but
at least one piece of experimental evidence is noteworthy. In an experiment by Güth
and Van Damme [24] fairness as motivation is refuted by the data. What they did is
to add a third player to the ultimatum game of …gure 3. The proposer was now able
to make an o¤er to both other players. But the di¤erence is that the third player
acted like a dummy: he had no possibility to reject the o¤er. One of the main results
is that only marginal o¤ers were proposed to the dummy player. They conclude that
the proposer was not intrinsically motivated by fairness considerations but that they
do not want to be fair, but rather want to appear fair.31
Güth and Van Damme conjecture that the ”observed behavior may not be due
to a taste for ”fairness” but rather to a social concern for what others might think
about oneself and for being held in high regard by others”.32 This comes, of course,
very close to what we have called social approval. This conjecture, favorable to
the social approval approach, is further strengthened by the works of Mauss [32],
Codere [13], and Drucker and Heizer [15]. This seems at least to be the case for the
more primitive societies but arguably also for modern economies.33 As a …nal piece
of evidence, Gächter and Fehr …nd that ”if ... the opportunity for social exchange
is combined with some minimal social familiarity, there is a substantial increase in
contribution levels” ([20], p. 352).
31This conclusion does not inevitably follow from the experimental results. Bolton and Ockenfels
[9] show that the results obtained by Güth and Van Damme can also be explained by their theory
of inequity aversion.
32Güth and Van Damme [24], p. 242.
33This latter statement is more than a guess. The description of Codere ([13], p. 63) that ”the
…rst of these features is that potlatching [the redistribution of property] existed in the context of a
fantastic surplus economy” is illustrative of this.
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6 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1. Taking the derivable of ui(li) results in symmetric reaction
























. Then l¤1 =
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w
l2+1¡'1 and l¤2 = ±w l1+1¡'2. These
curves are drawn in …gure 1 for 0 < ' < 1. The slope of l¤2 in the (l1; l2) space equals
±
w




Substitution to derive the equilibrium value (denoted by **) gives:
l¤¤1 =













Since the denominator is always positive for 0 < ±=w < 1; gifts are positive
whenever:




For the symmetric case considered in the proposition this reduces to: 1 > 'i(1 +
±=w)¡ ±=w or 'i < 1. This is equivalent to ¼i > (®=¯)1=(1¡®) ¡ w.
Proof of proposition 2. Denote the technology of player i by ±ili. Then notation
of ordinary utility needs to be modi…ed slightly as vi(xi) = [¼i + w(1 ¡ li) + ±jlj]®.
As long as we stick to Cournot-Nash behavior adequacy does not change the strategy
since it only a¤ects the other’s payo¤ and this is taken as given. However, suppose
that player i makes a conjecture about the equilibrium. By changing the adequacy he
changes the equilibrium supply of voluntary labor. Suppose then that he compares
di¤erent equilibria with di¤erent levels of adequacy.
We investigate the sign of the derivative @ui=@±i at the equilibrium choices of
voluntary labor supply l¤¤i;j: These should be accordingly rewritten into :
l¤¤i =



















Assume for simplicity that 'i = 'j = ' and de…ne Â ´ (1 ¡ ')=(1 ¡ ±i±j=w2):
Fist we show that ordinary utility is independent of the level of adequacy.








= Â ¢ 0 = 0;
and hence dvi=d±i = 0. Ordinary utility is una¤ected by a change in adequacy.
(There is a simple reason for this: since ± does not a¤ect the marginal utility of
social approval, in equilibrium the marginal utility of ordinary utility must remain






) < 0. The assumptions in the text (¼ > ¹¼ , ' < 1) and the
usual assumption that ±j < w guarantee that this last inequality holds. Since the
conditions are independent of the equilibrium values of voluntary labor supply, the
optimal adequacy levels are ±¤i = ±
¤
j = 0.
Proof of proposition 3. The net gift received is ¡xi + ±xj. For simplicity, assume
that xi = xj. Then:
E(uc) = pu(2 + y(x)¡ x+ ±x) + (1¡ p)u(y(x)¡ x);
E(ud) = pu(v + ±x) + (1¡ p)u(1):
Hence the di¤erence is given by:
E(uc)¡E(ud) = p[u(2+y(x)¡x+±x)¡u(y(x)¡x)¡u(v+±x)+u(1)]+u(y¡x)¡u(1):





(2 + y + ±x¡ x)¡ u0(v + ±x)]:
Hence, dE(uc) ¡ E(ud)=d± < 0 if u0(2 + y + ±x ¡ x) ¡ u0(v + ±x) < 0. For u00
this is the case if v < 2 + y ¡ x. Under risk-neutrality, u00 = 0, E(uc) ¡ E(ud) =
p(3¡ v) + y(x)¡ x¡ 1 and dE(uc)¡E(ud)=d± = 0.
Proof of proposition 4. Let wn > 0 denote the market wage and wv ¸ 0 the
compensation for ”voluntary labor”. De…ne next ~w = wn ¡ wv as the di¤erence in
the wages. Throughout it is assumed that ~w > 0. The equilibrium value li becomes:
l¤¤i =






where ~'i ´ wn'i= ~w:
Under the assumption of symmetrical agents this reduces to:
l¤¤i =













After multiplying through by ~w > 0 it is easily found that the derivative with




















¡ ¼i > wn:
This occurs at l¤¤i > 0 only if the denominator is negative (since the condition










if 1 < ±
~w
, wv > wn ¡ ±.
Note furthermore that extended utility is unchanged. With symmetrical agents,
si = 0 in equilibrium and straightforward calculations show that dui=dwv = 0. Hence,
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